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 Political Instability, Freedom, and Economic
 Growth: Some Further Evidence*
 Jakob de Haan and Clemens L. J. Siermann
 University of Groningen, The Netherlands
 I. Introduction
 Over time, the impact of both political and institutional factors on the
 rate of economic growth has received a lot of attention in the economic
 literature. Since Adam Smith (if not before) it has been observed that
 economic performance depends in part on political and institutional
 factors. Unfortunately, attempts to discover how and under what con-
 ditions such factors impinge on economic performance often did not
 progress beyond anecdote.1 It is only recently that more systematic
 attempts were undertaken to analyze the importance of political and
 institutional factors in explaining cross-country variances in eco-
 nomic growth. For instance, many researchers have examined whether
 the democratic character of national political procedures and institu-
 tions can help explain cross-country differences in national develop-
 ment. L. Sirowy and A. Inkeles reviewed 13 studies, all of which
 attempted to evaluate the economic consequences of variation in the
 democratic character of national political regimes. Sirowy and Inkeles
 conclude that the studies they considered present a very mixed and
 confusing picture with regard to the effect of democracy on economic
 growth.2
 The relationship between civil and political liberty, on the one
 hand, and economic growth, on the other, has also been the subject
 of much discussion. Two conflicting hypotheses have been advanced
 concerning the connection between economic growth and political
 freedom. Some economists argue that freedom fosters economic per-
 formance and hence economic growth; others pose that high growth
 rates require economic controls and reduced freedom. Four recent
 cross-section studies on economic growth have found evidence that
 lack of civil and political liberties is negatively correlated with eco-
 nomic growth.3 All of these studies used R. D. Gastil's measures of
 civil liberties or political rights.4 G. W. Scully concludes that, for the
 ? 1996 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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 115 market economies studied over the period 1960-80, the politically
 open societies that subscribe to political, civil, and economic liberty
 grow at three times the rate of societies in which these freedoms are
 restricted. For their group of 47 countries, R. C. Kormendi and P. G.
 Meguire find that countries in the high civil liberty category experience
 about 1% greater annual economic growth. Similarly, K. B. Grier and
 G. Tullock conclude that repressive countries in Africa and the Ameri-
 cas have about a 1.5-percentage-point lower annual growth rate than
 do other countries included in their study. R. J. Barro's results for a
 sample of 98 countries also indicate that restricted political rights are
 associated with lower per capita growth.
 Recently, also the issue of political instability and economic
 growth has been investigated by a number of scholars. Most empirical
 studies point to political instability as an important hindrance for eco-
 nomic growth, since political instability reduces the supply of both
 capital and labor. Investment is discouraged due to the increased risk
 of capital loss, and political turmoil causes capital flight and brain
 drain. Political unrest also hampers the establishment of property
 rights, which are necessary in order to realize productivity gains asso-
 ciated with impersonal exchange.
 In his cross-section model for 98 countries for 1960-85 Barro in-
 cluded two variables to measure political instability: the number of
 revolutions and coups per year and the number, per million population,
 of political assassinations per year. He interprets these variables as
 adverse influences on property rights and finds that both variables
 exert a significant negative influence on economic growth. A. K. Fosu
 examined the importance of political instability from 1960 to 1986 for
 31 sub-Saharan African countries. He also concludes that political in-
 stability has, on average, a deleterious impact on economic growth.6
 It is very surprising that most studies reviewed so far do not differ-
 entiate between different groups of countries. The first purpose of this
 article is to examine whether empirical relationships between political
 instability and political freedom-as measured globally by most other
 researchers-are also valid for smaller geographic areas. The second
 purpose is to analyze whether results of previous estimates are sensi-
 tive with respect to the definition of measures for political instability
 and freedom. We examine a sample of 97 countries from 1963 to 1988
 to determine whether lack of political stability and lack of political
 freedom are negatively correlated with economic growth. We find
 some evidence that lack of political stability affects economic growth
 in Africa. However, this finding is not robust, since other measures of
 political instability alter this outcome quite dramatically. There is some
 evidence that in Latin America political repression is negatively corre-
 lated with economic development. However, we show that this conclu-
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 sion is highly dependent on the way the political repression variable
 is constructed.
 Kormendi and Meguire argue that political repression affects eco-
 nomic growth mainly through the investment-income ratio (IIR). The
 third purpose of this article is to extend their line of research by exam-
 ining the relationship between political stability and political freedom
 and the IIR. We find that in Africa and Asia our indicators for political
 instability are negatively related to the IIR. There is some mixed evi-
 dence that in Latin America political repression may hamper capital
 formation.
 The article is organized as follows. Section II discusses the model
 and our data. Section III presents estimation results concerning the
 relationship between political instability and economic growth. Section
 IV contains our findings with respect to the impact of political freedom.
 In this section we also address Barro's finding that when political insta-
 bility and political freedom are simultaneously introduced into a
 growth regression, the civil liberties measure loses its significance.
 Finally, Section V summarizes the article and presents suggestions for
 future research.
 II. Our Model and the Data
 We have estimated variants of the following cross-section equation:7
 Q = ao + a, L + a2K + a3P+v, (1)
 where Q, L, and K are the average growth rates of real GDP, popula-
 tion, and capital, respectively, and P is a measure of political instability
 or lack of political freedom and v is the error term. The coefficients a,
 and a2 are expected to be positive, while most previous research would
 suggest that a3 will prove to be negative.
 For the period 1963-88 we have constructed a data set for 97
 countries. This sample excludes the major oil-exporting countries.
 These countries tend to have a high level of per capita GDP, which is,
 however, primarily caused by large amounts of income from selling
 off natural resources. The mean annual growth rate of real GDP was
 taken from the 1990 and 1991 issues of the International Monetary
 Fund's International Financial Statistics (IFS) Yearbook.8 Data on the
 growth rate of capital, following Fosu, measured as mean gross domes-
 tic investment as a percentage of GDP, is taken from R. Summers and
 A. Heston's data set.9 Data on population growth are also derived
 from this source.
 Our measure of political instability (TRNS) is based on the total
 number of government changes. This variable is assigned a value of
 one if the number of government transfers exceeds seven (the median
This content downloaded from 129.125.148.19 on Thu, 20 Dec 2018 10:23:07 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 342 Economic Development and Cultural Change
 number of transfers for the countries in our sample) and zero other-
 wise. In contrast to most other studies employing government transfers
 as indicator for political instability-see, e.g., S. Edwards and G. Ta-
 bellini-we do not use the total number of government transfers as
 such.1o We have also experimented with other measures of political
 instability, taking six government transfers (the average for Africa)
 and eight transfers (the average for Latin America) as alternative cutoff
 points. Data on government transfers are taken from C. L. Taylor and
 D. Jodice for the period 1963-77.11 For 1978-88 we constructed our
 instability measures on the basis of various issues of A. S. Banks's
 Political Handbook of the World.12
 Gastil has constructed two measures of freedom: civil liberty and
 political liberty. The civil rights rankings purport to measure the rights
 of the individual (e.g., independence of the judiciary and freedom of
 the press). The political rights rankings are based on the degree to
 which individuals in a state have control over those who govern. This
 measure is based on issues like freedom of the electoral process, pres-
 ence of intimidating violence, and the presence of an effective opposi-
 tion. The index runs from one (most free) to seven (least free). As
 both measures of freedom are highly correlated, in Section IV we only
 report the regression outcomes using dummy variables that are based
 on Gastil's political rights index. The dummy DPRI3 is one if the
 average of Gastil's political rights index for the period 1973-86 is three
 or higher and it is zero otherwise. For the dummy DPRI4 the average
 of four is used as a cutoff point. By using two dummies we are able
 to investigate the sensitivity of our results for alternative transforma-
 tions. In Section IV we show that the outcomes are indeed sensitive
 with respect to the construction of the political rights dummy.13
 Table 1 summarizes our data. It is interesting to note that the
 variance of our political instability measure is very similar for the
 various groups of countries that we examine. Except perhaps for Af-
 rica, this also holds true for our measures of political freedom. The
 lower part of table 1 shows the partial correlation between our mea-
 sures for political instability and political freedom. It follows that this
 correlation is quite low.
 III. Political Instability and Economic Growth
 Before estimating the model, we first have to deal with a problem
 that was identified by Kormendi and Meguire.14 They argue that if
 the political-institutional variable affects economic development solely
 through the investment ratio, inclusion of capital growth should
 remove its effect. Therefore, we followed Kormendi and Me-
 guire by excluding investment in estimating the model. As sug-
 gested by these authors, we also estimated simple models for the IIR.
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 TABLE 1
 SUMMARY MEASURES OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
 POLITICAL POLITICAL
 STABILITY FREEDOM
 Q K L TRNS DPRI3 DPRI4
 Average:
 World (97) 4.0 18.3 2.1 .52 .54 .47
 Africa (37) 3.9 13.2 2.8 .30 .84 .76
 Latin America (23) 3.7 16.6 2.3 .52 .56 .43
 Asia (22) 6.2 20.6 3.0 .59 .68 .68
 Standard deviation:
 World 1.9 8.8 1.0 .50 .50 .50
 Africa 2.2 8.4 .5 .46 .37 .43
 Latin America 1.6 5.6 .8 .51 .51 .51
 Asia 3.7 9.5 1.3 .50 .48 .48
 DPRI3 and TRNS DPRI4 and TRNS
 Partial correlation be-
 tween political in-
 stability and polit-
 ical freedom:
 World - .24 - .24
 Africa -.03 -.04
 Latin America .21 .14
 Asia -.17 -.17
 NOTE.-The number of countries is shown in parentheses. Q, K, and L are the
 growth rate of real GDP, capital (measured as investment as a percentage of GDP), and
 population, respectively. The measure of political instability, TRNS, is 1 if the number
 of government transfers exceeds 7 and is 0 otherwise. The measure of political freedom,
 DPRI3, is 1 in case the average of Gastil's political rights index for the period 1973-86
 is 3 or higher and is 0 otherwise. For the dummy DPRI4, the average of 4 is used as a
 cutoff point.
 The IIR estimation results are reported in the second part of this
 section.
 Row la of table 2 presents the estimation results of equation (1)
 for our total sample of 97 countries, using TRNS as a measure of
 political instability. The standard errors for the coefficients are based
 on H. White's heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix.15 Most
 coefficients are significant at the 10% level or more. The coefficient of
 the political instability variable is negative, but not very significantly
 so. Excluding investment increases its significance only slightly (row
 I b).
 We also estimated the model for three different continents: Africa,
 Latin America, and Asia. In Africa political instability appears as a
 very important factor in determining economic growth (rows 2a and
 2b of table 2). Fosu also found for his sample of 31 sub-Saharan African
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 TABLE 2
 REGRESSION RESULTS: POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1963-88
 R2
 Regression Constant K L TRNS (Adjusted) SEE
 All countries:
 (la) 2.13* .07* .45** -.55 .09 1.79
 (.88) (.03) (.24) (.36)
 (lb) 3.92* . . . 18 -.65 .03 1.85
 (.48) . . . (.17) (.39)
 Africa:
 (2a) .77 .08 .90* - 1.33* .23 1.96
 (1.45) (.05) (.44) (.52)
 (2b) 1.09 . . . 1.20* - 1.77* .18 2.02
 (1.49) . . . (.58) (.64)
 Latin Ameria:
 (3a) 1.30 .03 .93** -.34 .10 1.53
 (1.60) (.06) (.50) (.61)
 (3b) 1.85 . . . .92** -.44 .14 1.50
 (1.33) . . . (.49) (.63)
 Asia:
 (4a) 5.56 .06 .13 -1.72 -.04 3.73
 (3.93) (.12) (1.00) (2.14)
 (4b) 7.07* . . . .14 -2.22 - .01 3.68
 (2.58) . . . (1.00) (1.75)
 NOTE.-The model estimated is eq. (1), where our measure of political instability
 (TRNS) is based on the number of government transfers; this variable is 1 if the number
 of government transfers exceeds 7 and is 0 otherwise. See Sec. II for a description of the
 other variables used. Standard errors of the regression (SEE) are shown in parentheses.
 * Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed).
 ** Significant at the .10 level (one-tailed).
 countries over the period 1960-86 that political instability severely
 hampered economic growth. However, if alternative measures of polit-
 ical instability are used, the results change significantly. For instance,
 using TRNS6-this variable is assigned a value of one, if the number of
 government transfers exceeds six (the average number of government
 transfers in Africa) and zero otherwise-yields
 Q = 0.42 + 0.09K + 0.91L - 0.51 TRNS6
 (1.50) (0.05) (0.48) (0.50)
 (2)
 R2 = 0.37 SEE = 1.28.
 In Latin America the coefficient of TRNS is not significant (row 3a of
 table 2). This result hardly changes when investment is excluded (row
 3b). In Asia the coefficient of our political instability measure is also
 not significantly different from zero (row 4a).16 Note, however, that
 when investment is excluded, the significance of the coefficient for
 TRNS increases, suggesting that political instability may after all affect
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 growth through its impact on the investment-income ratio. These find-
 ings are not altered if other measures of political instability are used.
 In conclusion, we find some support for the view that political
 instability directly hampers economic growth in Africa but not in Latin
 America and Asia. Our results, therefore, suggest that the empirical
 relationship between economic performance and political instability
 that is generally measured at a global level may be valid only for
 smaller geographic areas. Furthermore, the results are sensitive with
 respect to the definition of the political instability measure.
 Kormendi and Meguire have found a strong correlation between
 the level of the investment-income ratio and their political-institutional
 variable. We take up this line of research by estimating simple models
 of the IIR. Following Kormendi and Meguire, we estimate a model for
 the IIR, in which our proxy for political instability is the only explana-
 tory variable. Table 3 presents the estimation results. The outcomes
 are consistent with those reported in table 2. It follows from table 3
 that in Africa and Asia political instability is negatively related to the
 IIR. These conclusions are not sensitive with respect to the definition
 of the political instability measure. Using alternative cutoff points in
 the definition of the political stability measures does not change our
 conclusions. Our findings imply that in Africa and Asia political insta-
 bility may affect economic growth in indirect ways.
 IV. Political Freedom and Economic Growth
 The first row of table 4 presents the estimation results for our total
 sample of 97 countries, using DPRI3 to differentiate countries on the
 basis of political freedom.17 Although the coefficient of DPRI3 is nega-
 tive, it is not significantly different from zero. Kormendi and Meguire
 found in their regression for a sample of 47 countries a (marginally
 significant) negative coefficient of Gastil's civil liberty index. How-
 TABLE 3
 REGRESSION RESULTS: POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND THE IIR, 1963-88
 Regression Constant TRNS R2 (Adjusted) SEE
 (1) All countries 18.30* .00 -.01 8.87
 (1.31) (1.80)
 (2) Africa 14.85* - 5.99* .09 7.67
 (1.57) (2.17)
 (3) Latin America 18.38* -3.47 .06 5.46
 (1.48) (2.26)
 (4) Asia 25.32* -8.82* .17 8.88
 (3.65) (4.13)
 NOTE.-The model estimated is IIR = a, + a2 TRNS + e.
 Standard errors of the regression (SEE) are shown in parentheses.
 * Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed).
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 TABLE 4
 REGRESSION RESULTS: POLITICAL FREEDOM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1963-88
 R2
 Regression Constant K L DPRI3 (Adjusted) SEE
 All countries:
 (la) 1.77* .06* .64* - .55 .09 1.79
 (.87) (.03) (.28) (.54)
 (Ib) 3.43* .46 -.77 .03 1.85
 (.34) (.26) (.56)
 Africa:
 (2a) 1.19 .10* .91* -1.40 .21 1.98
 (1.32) (.05) (.47) (1.13)
 (2b) 1.31 1.35* -1.39 .09 2.13
 (1.38) (.58) (1.29)
 Latin Ameria:
 (3a) 1.94 .02 .88** -.92 .18 1.46
 (1.78) (.06) (.46) (.71)
 (3b) 2.27 .87** - .96 .22 1.43
 (1.28) (.44) (.61)
 Asia:
 (4a) 3.97 .08 - .41 2.68** .02 3.63
 (3.39) (.11) (.99) (1.37)
 (4b) 5.58* - .48 2.99* .03 3.61
 (2.24) (1.00) (1.27)
 NOTE.-The model estimated is eq. (1), using DPRI3 as measure of political free-
 dom. Standard errors of the regression (SEE) are shown in parentheses.
 * Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed).
 ** Significant at the .10 level (one-tailed).
 ever, their results were highly dependent on the exclusion of the in-
 vestment-income ratio, suggesting that the effect of civil liberty on
 growth operates through the investment channel. Indeed, when invest-
 ment is left out, both the coefficient of DPRI3 and its significance
 increase, although the coefficient remains insignificant (row lb). This
 suggests that political repression may affect economic growth through
 its influence on capital formation. Below we present some further evi-
 dence that supports this hypothesis.
 Rows 2-4 of table 4 show the results for Africa, Latin America,
 and Asia, respectively. It follows that in sharp contrast to the results
 for our total sample, the coefficient of DPRI3 is nowhere negative
 and significantly different from zero if investment is included. When
 investment is excluded, the magnitude and significance of DPRI3
 hardly change. Note, however, that in Asia the coefficient of DPRI3
 is positive and significantly different from zero.
 Table 5 reports the estimated IIR model if, following Kormendi
 and Meguire, the only explanatory variables are a constant and DPRI3.
 The results are quite consistent with those in table 4. Only for our
 total sample is there evidence that the IIR is negatively related to our
 proxy for political freedom.
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 TABLE 5
 REGRESSION RESULTS: POLITICAL FREEDOM AND THE IIR, 1963-88
 Regression Constant DPRI3 R2 (Adjusted) SEE
 (1) All countries 21.97* -6.85* .14 8.17
 (1.07) (1.64)
 (2) Africa 12.87* .39 -.03 8.14
 (2.91) (3.24)
 (3) Latin America 18.13* -2.75 .02 5.57
 (.97) (2.15)
 (4) Asia 18.64* 1.88 -.04 9.92
 (3.45) (4.30)
 NoTE.-The model estimated is IIR = aI + a2 DPRI3 + e.
 Standard errors of the regression (SEE) are shown in parentheses.
 * Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed).
 To examine whether our findings are sensitive with respect to
 the construction of our political freedom dummy, we reestimated all
 equations in tables 4 and 5, using a dummy (DPRI4) based on four (at
 Gastil's index) istead of three as the cutoff point. This generally yielded
 the same outcomes (not shown). However, for Latin America the re-
 sults changed dramatically. The growth equation becomes
 Q = 3.45 - 0.03K + 0.64L - 1.76 DPR14
 (1.48) (0.03) (0.42) (0.60)
 R = 0.37 SEE = 1.28. (3)
 Finally, we reestimated all equations in tables 4 and 5 and included
 the measures for instability and civil liberties simultaneously. Barro
 found that in that case civil liberties lose their significance in the growth
 regression. For our total sample of countries our equations are
 Q = 2.38 + 0.06K + 0.60L - 0.66 TRNS - 0.69 DPR13
 (0.85) (0.03) (0.27) (0.36) (0.53)
 (4)
 R2= 0.11 SEE= 1.77
 and
 IIR = 23.09 - 1.74 TRNS - 7.27* DPR13
 (1.49) (1.62) (1.58)(5)
 R2=0.14 SEE=8.17.
 The coefficient and significance of DPRI3 are very similar to those
 reported in tables 4 and 5, respectively. Indeed, in the growth and
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 IIR equations for the other country groups, the significance of DPRI3
 remained the same as reported in tables 4 and 5 (not shown here;
 available from us on request). Thus, simultaneously including political
 stability and political freedom measures does not change our conclu-
 sions.
 In conclusion, we find little support for the view that political
 repression negatively affects economic growth in our regional groups.
 Only in Latin America is there some evidence that political repression
 hampers economic growth, but this conclusion is very sensitive with
 respect to the construction of the political repression variable. In Asia
 political repression is positively associated with economic growth.
 Again, there are marked differences in the results for the entire sample
 of countries and those for various smaller geographic areas.
 V. Summary and Suggestions for Future Research
 This article has three purposes: first, to examine whether the empirical
 relationship between political instability and political freedom and eco-
 nomic growth, generally measured with global data, also holds for
 smaller geographic areas; second, to analyze whether estimation re-
 sults are sensitive with respect to the delineation of measures for politi-
 cal instability and freedom; and third, to investigate the relationship
 between political stability and political freedom and capital formation
 in order to determine whether the political-institutional variable affects
 economic development through the investment ratio.
 Using data for a sample of 97 countries for the period 1963-88 we
 examined whether lack of political stability and lack of political free-
 dom are negatively correlated with economic growth. We estimated a
 cross-section model based on a simple neoclassical production func-
 tion. Our measures of political instability are based on the total number
 of government changes. Two dummies based on Gastil's political rights
 index are used to measure political freedom. A first conclusion is that
 results for various regional groups of countries are often very different.
 We find that only in Africa is there mixed support for the view that
 political instability reduces economic growth, both directly and
 through its effect on capital growth. However, the results in the growth
 equation for Africa are rather sensitive with respect to the definition of
 the political instability measure. In Asia there is evidence that political
 instability hampers investment. There is also some mixed evidence
 that political repression reduces economic growth in Latin America;
 this result, however, is highly dependent on the construction of the
 political repression variable. Political repression and growth are posi-
 tively associated in Asia.
 An important issue that is not addressed in this article is causality.
 Following recent literature, we have based our estimates on the pre-
 sumption that political instability and repression may hamper eco-
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 nomic growth. However, the causality may be the other way round;
 that is, the record of economic growth may affect political stability.
 Mancur Olson, for instance, argues that
 Rapid economic growth, whatever the nature of the economic system,
 must involve fast and deep changes in the ways that things are done, in
 the places that things are done, and in the distribution of power and
 prestige. Most people spend such a large proportion of their time work-
 ing for a living and draw such a large part of their social status and
 political influence from their economic position that changes in the eco-
 nomic order must have great effects on other facets of life . . . There-
 fore, until further research is done, the presumption must be that rapid
 economic growth, far from being the source of domestic tranquillity that
 it is sometimes supposed to be, is rather a disruptive and destabilizing
 force that leads to political instability.8
 It is clear that the results reported here do not support Olson's view,
 since if there is any significant correlation at all, it is between low
 growth rates and political instability. However, it is possible that a
 disappointing growth performance leads to political instability. In fu-
 ture research this issue should be addressed.
 In this article we have used a very simple growth model to exam-
 ine the impact of political instability and lack of freedom on economic
 growth. Further research is needed in which more elaborate growth
 and investment models are used to examine the robustness of our
 findings.
 Notes
 * We would like to thank C. A. de Kam and the editor and two referees
 of this journal for their helpful comments on a previous version of this article.
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 cluded exports in our model. As suggested by one of the referees, we have
 also estimated the model by using the growth rate of investment minus the
 growth rate of the population, to take account of the correlation of the right-
 hand-side variables. This did not, however, affect our general conclusions.
 8. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Year-
 book (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1990 and 1991), vols. 43 and 44.
 9. R. Summers and A. Heston, "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An
 Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988," Quarterly Journal
 of Economics 106 (May 1991): 327-68.
 10. Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini, "Explaining Fiscal Policies
 and Inflation in Developing Countries," Journal of International Money and
 Finance 10, suppl. (1991): S16-S48. We have also constructed a similar dichot-
 omous variable based on the number of irregular government transfers (coups).
 Since this variable generally yielded the same outcomes, we do not report
 them here.
 11. C. L. Taylor and D. Jodice, World Handbook of Social and Political
 Indicators (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983).
 12. Arthur S. Banks, Political Handbook of the World (New York:
 McGraw-Hill), various issues.
 13. We have also experimented using an average of five as a cutoff point,
 but this yielded similar results as for the models with PRI4.
 14. Kormendi and Meguire (n. 3 above), p. 46.
 15. H. White, "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Esti-
 mator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica 48 (May 1980):
 817-38.
 16. Note the very poor fit of the regression for Asia. Apparently the model
 is not able to capture the highly diverging development patterns in Asia. We
 have tried various country-dummies to improve the fit, but this did not change
 our basic conclusion with respect to the significance of the coefficient of
 TRNS.
 17. See Sec. II for further details on the construction of this dummy.
 18. Mancur Olson, "Rapid Economic Growth as a Destabilizing Force,"
 Journal of Economic History 23 (1963): 519-52, quote on 550.
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